We model illiquidity as a restriction on the stopping rules investors can follow in selling assets, and apply this framework to the valuation of thinly traded investments. We find that discounts for illiquidity can be surprisingly large, approaching 30%-50% in some cases. Immediacy plays a unique role and is valued much more than ongoing liquidity. We show that investors in illiquid enterprises have strong incentives to increase dividends and other cash payouts, thereby introducing potential agency conflicts. We also find that illiquidity and volatility are fundamentally entangled in their effects on asset prices. This aspect may help explain why some assets are viewed as inherently more liquid than others and why liquidity concerns are heightened during financial crises.
Introduction
Thinly traded assets are often defined as investments for which there is no liquid market available. Thus, investors holding illiquid or thinly traded assets may not be able to sell their positions for extended periods-if ever. At best, investors may only be able to sell in infrequent privately negotiated transactions. The economics of these private transactions, however, are complicated since prospective buyers realize that they will inherit the same problem when they later want to resell the assets. Not surprisingly, sales of thinly traded assets typically occur at prices far lower than would be the case if there were a liquid public market.
The valuation of thinly traded assets is one of the most important unresolved issues in asset pricing and has many fundamental implications for individuals, firms, markets, and policymakers. One reason for this is that thinly traded assets collectively represent a large fraction of the aggregate wealth in the economy. Key examples where investors may face long delays before being able to liquidate holdings include the following:
• Sole proprietorships.
• Partnerships, limited partnerships.
• Private equity and venture capital.
• Life insurance and annuities.
• Pensions and retirement assets.
• Residential and commercial real estate.
• Private placements of debt and equity.
• Distressed assets and fire sales.
• Compensation in the form of restricted options and shares.
• Investments in education and human capital.
Other examples include transactions that take public firms private such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) that result in residual equity holders having much less liquid positions. Many hedge funds have lockup provisions that prohibit investors from withdrawing their capital for months or even years. Investors in initial public offerings (IPOs) are often allocated shares with restrictions on reselling or "flipping" the shares.
Many insightful approaches have been used in the asset pricing literature to study the effects of illiquidity on security prices, and these are briefly described in the literature review section below. This paper approaches the challenge of valuing illiquid assets from a new perspective. We view illiquidity as a restriction on the set of stopping rules that an investor is allowed to follow in selling the asset. This approach allows us to use an option-theoretic framework to place realistic bounds on the values of securities that cannot be traded continuously.
To illustrate the intuition behind our approach, let Ω denote the set of all stopping rules available to an investor when the asset is fully liquid. Let A ⊂ Ω denote the restricted subset of stopping rules available because of the illiquidity of the asset. Finally, let B ⊂ A be a subset of A that contains only one element-the worst-case stopping rule in A. Our approach consists of finding an upper bound on the amount that would be required to fully compensate an investor for the welfare loss from restricting his stopping rules to subset B. Using a simple dominance argument, however, it is clear that this amount also represents an upper bound on what would be required to fully compensate an investor who was limited to the less-restricted subset A. Thus, by finding a bound for the worst-case scenario, our results also apply for less-severe forms of illiquidity encountered in actual markets. This paper contributes to an extensive literature that uses dominance arguments to provide asset pricing bounds. Key examples include the no-arbitrage optionpricing bounds derived by Merton (1973) and the bounds on the moments of the stochastic discount factor obtained by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) . There are many reasons why having a lower bound on the value of an illiquid asset could be useful. The lower bound could serve as a reservation price in negotiations between sellers and prospective buyers and provide a benchmark in litigation and dispute resolution. The lower bound could also provide guidance to regulators and policymakers in making regulatory capital decisions or establishing limits on the collateral value of illiquid assets used to secure debt financing or in margin accounts. 1 The results provide a number of important insights into the potential effects of illiquidity on asset values. First, we show that the value of immediacy in financial markets is much higher than the value of future liquidity. For example, the discount for illiquidity for the first day of illiquidity is 2.4 times that for the second day, 4.2 times that for the fifth day, 6.2 times that for the tenth day, and 20.0 times that for the 100th day. These results suggest that immediacy is viewed as fundamentally different in its nature. This dramatic time asymmetry in the value of liquidity may also help explain the rapidly growing trend toward electronic execution and high-frequency trading in many financial markets.
Second, our results confirm that the values of illiquid assets can be heavily discounted in the market. We show that investors could discount the value of illiquid assets by as much as 10%, 20%, or 30% for illiquidity horizons of one, two, or five years, respectively. Although our results only provide lower bounds on the values of illiquid assets, the evidence in the empirical literature suggests that these bounds may be realistic approximations of the prices at which various types of thinly traded securities are sold in privately negotiated transactions. For example, Silber (1991) documents that restricted stocks-stocks that investors cannot trade for two years after they are acquired-are placed privately at an average discount of 34% relative to fully liquid shares, and many are placed at discounts in excess of 50%. Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) find that when an exchange rule allowing forward trading was abolished, the decreased liquidity of the affected shares resulted in prices declining by 15%. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) show that portfolios of Treasury inflation protected securities have traded at discounts of more than 23% relative to portfolios of more-liquid Treasury bonds with identical cash flows. Aragon (2007) finds that hedge funds with lockups have annual returns that average 4%-7% more than hedge funds without lockups. Brenner et al. (2001) find that thinly traded currency options with three-to sixmonth maturities are placed privately at roughly a 20% discount to fully liquid options. Chen and Xiong (2001) show that restricted institutional shares in China trade at average discounts of 78%-86% relative to otherwise identical common shares. There are many other similar examples in the empirical literature (for example, see the review article by Amihud et al. 2005) .
Third, we find that the effects of illiquidity and volatility on asset prices are fundamentally entangled. Specifically, asset return variances and the degree of asset illiquidity are indistinguishable in their effects on discounts for illiquidity. This makes intuitive sense since investors are more likely to want to sell assets when prices have diverged significantly from their original purchase prices. This divergence, however, can arise both through the passage of time as well as through the volatility of asset prices. Because of this, assets with stable prices such as cash or short-term Treasury bills can be viewed as inherently more liquid than assets such as stocks even when all are readily tradable. This may also help explain why concerns about market liquidity become much more central during financial crises and periods of market stress.
Finally, the results indicate that the effect of illiquidity on asset prices is smaller for investments with higher dividends or cash payouts. An important implication of this is that investors in illiquid assets such as private equity, venture capital, leveraged buyouts, etc. have strong economic incentives to increase payouts. Thus, illiquidity may have the potential to be a fundamental driver of both dividend policy and capital structure decisions for privately held ventures or thinly traded firms.
Literature Review
The literature on the effects of illiquidity on asset valuation is far too extensive for us to be able to review in detail. Instead, we will simply summarize some of the key themes that have been discussed in this literature. For an in-depth survey of this literature, see the excellent review by Amihud et al. (2005) on liquidity and asset prices.
Many important papers in this literature focus on the role played by transaction costs and other financial frictions in determining security prices. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) present a model in which riskneutral investors consider the effect of future transaction costs in determining current valuations for assets. Constantinides (1986) shows that while transaction costs can have a large effect on trading volume, investors optimally trade in a way that mitigates the effect of transaction costs on prices. Vayanos (1998) and Vayanos and Vila (1999) A number of recent papers recognize that liquidity is time varying and develop models in which liquidity risk is priced into asset valuations. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) consider a model in which marketwide systemic liquidity risk is priced. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show how time-varying liquidity risk affects current security prices and future expected returns. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) develop models in which changes in the abilities of dealers to fund their inventories translates into variation in the liquidity they can provide, which in turn results in a liquidity risk premium being embedded into asset values.
Another recent theme in the literature addresses the effects of search costs or the cost of being present in the market on liquidity and asset prices. Duffie et al. (2005 Duffie et al. ( , 2007 , Vayanos and Wang (2007) , Vayanos and Weill (2008) , Duffie et al. (2009) , and others consider models in which agents incur costs as they search for other investors willing to trade with them, and show how these costs affect security prices. Wang (2009, 2010) study asset pricing in a market where it is costly for dealers to be continuously present in the market and provide liquidity.
A number of papers in the literature view illiquidity from the perspective of a limitation on the ability of an agent to trade continuously. Lippman and McCall (1986) define liquidity in terms of the expected time to execute trading strategies. Longstaff (1995 Longstaff ( , 2001 , Kahl et al. (2003) , and Finnerty (2012) study the implications of trading restrictions on assets. Longstaff (2009) presents a general equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents must hold asset positions for a fixed horizon rather than being able to trade continuously.
Finally, several papers approach the valuation of liquidity from an option-theoretic perspective. In Copeland and Galai (1983) , dealers take inventory risk by providing bid and ask quotes over some horizon in markets where investors may have private information. They show that the bid-ask spread compensating the dealers for bearing this risk can be modeled as a option straddle. Similarly, Chacko et al. (2008) value immediacy by modeling limit orders as American options. Ang and Bollen (2010) model the option to withdraw funds from a hedge fund as a real option. Ghaidarov (2014) models the option to sell equity securities as a forward-starting put option.
Modeling Illiquidity
In this section, we present a new approach to modeling thin trading or illiquidity in financial markets. This approach provides a simple framework that can be used to place lower bounds on the values of illiquid assets. Note that placing a lower bound on the value of the illiquid asset is equivalent to placing an upper bound on the size of the discount for illiquidity. For clarity, we will generally couch the discussion in terms of the discount for illiquidity.
The concept of a stopping rule plays a central role in how we model illiquidity. Intuitively, a stopping rule can be viewed as a decision rule that determines the (potentially random) stopping time τ when the asset is to be sold, where τ depends only on information available in the market up to and including time τ. For example, a decision rule to sell the asset at a prespecified date T is a stopping rule. A decision rule to sell the asset via a limit order that is executed the first time the asset price reaches a value of, say, 50 is a stopping rule. In contrast, a decision rule to sell the asset when its price reaches its maximum value between time zero and time T is not a stopping rule since the time at which the maximum is attained is not known for certain prior to time T.
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The key insight underlying this modeling framework is that illiquidity can be viewed as a restriction on the set of stopping rules that an investor can follow in selling the asset. In particular, an investor that purchases a liquid asset can follow any stopping rule he chooses in selling the asset. In contrast, an investor that purchases an illiquid asset is restricted to a subset of stopping rules. If the investor's preferred stopping rule is not included in the subset, then the investor must choose a stopping rule that is suboptimal from his perspective. In this case, the investor suffers a welfare loss and may only be willing to purchase the illiquid asset at a discount relative to what he would be willing to pay for the fully liquid asset.
Specifically, let T denote the horizon over which an investor faces illiquidity constraints on his holdings of an asset.
3 Let X T denote the value of the investor's position at time T if the investor were able to follow his preferred stopping rule in selling the asset and then reinvesting the proceeds in the riskless asset. Similarly, let Y T denote the value of the investor's position at time T by following the best stopping rule allowed him by the illiquidity of the asset and then reinvesting the proceeds in the riskless asset. Clearly, if an investor has preferences over stopping rules, then these two outcomes are not equivalent and the investor may be unwilling to pay as much for the illiquid asset.
Viewing illiquidity from this perspective suggests a very intuitive framework for placing bounds on the discount for illiquidity. Recall that ex ante, the investor would prefer to receive X T at time T, but will only receive Y T because of the illiquidity of the asset. However, if the investor were to be given an option that allowed him to exchange X T for Y T at time T (known as an exchange option), then the investor would be made completely whole on an ex post basis. In particular, an investor with a portfolio consisting of the illiquid asset and an exchange option with cash flow max ( max(X T , Y T ). This cash flow, however, is greater than or equal to the cash flow X T that the investor would have received had he purchased the liquid asset instead of the illiquid asset. A simple dominance argument implies that the investor would prefer the portfolio of the illiquid asset and the exchange option to owning the liquid asset. In turn, this implies that the sum of the values of the illiquid asset and the exchange option should be greater than or equal to that of the liquid asset, or alternatively, that the value of the exchange option represents an upper bound on the discount for illiquidity.
Recall that we designated Y T as the value of the investor's position by following the best stopping rule from the subset A of stopping rules permitted by the illiquidity of the asset. It is important to observe, however, that the above analysis holds even when the stopping rule is chosen from a more restricted subset of A, which we designate as B. This follows since the investor still prefers max(X T , Y T ) to X T , where Y T is now the value of the investor's portfolio following the best stopping rule in B. Thus, the value of the exchange option with payoff max(0, X T − Y T ) also represents an upper bound on the discount for illiquidity. Furthermore, this is true for any subset B ⊂ A. We will use this result in the next section since by limiting B to the worst-case stopping rule (buy and hold), we can easily identify Y T and solve for the value of the exchange option. Intuitively, this simply means that by compensating the investor for the worst-case illiquidity scenario, we are also fully compensating the investor for the actual illiquidity scenario he faces. Thus, the upper bound we derive is applicable even when the illiquidity of the asset does not limit the investor to following a buyand-hold strategy. 
The Discount for Illiquidity
As discussed above, the task of finding the upper bound on the discount for illiquidity can be reduced to solving for the value of the exchange option. To do this, we first need to specify a valuation framework for the exchange option.
As the valuation framework for the exchange option, we adopt the familiar Black and Scholes (1973) optionpricing setting. Let S t be the price per share of an asset, where the share is fully liquid and can be traded continuously in the financial markets without frictions. We assume that the dynamics of S t are given by the following geometric Brownian motion process under the risk-neutral pricing measure,
where r is the constant riskless rate, σ is the volatility of continuously compounded returns, and dZ is the increment of a standard Brownian motion. For simplicity, we assume for the present that the asset does not pay any dividends or cash flows before time T. This assumption, however, will be relaxed later.
As described above, we will solve for value of the exchange option under the worst-case illiquidity scenario. The resulting value of the exchange option will clearly provide an upper bound for the amount required to compensate investors who acquire assets with less-severe liquidity restrictions. Specifically, the worst-case scenario is that once the illiquid asset is purchased at time zero, it cannot be sold again until time T. Thus, the illiquid asset is completely nonmarketable from time zero to time T. In this worst-case scenario, an investor who buys the illiquid asset at time zero has only one stopping rule available-selling the asset at time T. As a result, the cash flow received at time T from following this stopping rule is simply Y T S T .
Next, we need to identify X T . To do so, we need several preliminary results. First, let τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ T, denote the time at which the stopping rule chosen by the investor results in the liquid asset being sold. The cash flow received by the investor from selling the liquid asset at time τ and reinvesting the proceeds in the riskless asset is X T S τ e r(T−τ) . Second, substituting these expressions for X T and Y T into the expression for the payoff from an exchange option implies that the cash flow at time T from the exchange option is given by max(0, S τ e r(T−τ) − S T ).
As shown, this cash flow depends on the asset price at both the stopping time τ and the final date T. An important implication of this is that once the stopping time τ is reached, the value of S τ is known and is no longer stochastic. This means that as of time τ, the exchange option can be viewed as a simple put option on the asset value with a fixed strike price of S τ e r(T−τ) . Thus, as shown in the appendix (which provides the derivation for this and all other results in the paper), the value of the option at time τ is given by substituting in the current stock price S τ and the strike price S τ e r(T−τ) into the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for puts,
where N( · ) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. This expression for the value of the option as of the stopping time τ is true for any stopping rule. Third, to solve for the initial or time-zero value of the exchange option, we take the present value of receiving a cash flow at time τ equal to the value of the put given in Equation (3), where the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution of S τ and the stopping time τ.
For any choice of τ, the value of the exchange option in Equation (4) provides an upper bound on the discount for illiquidity. Rather than attempting to solve for the value of the exchange option for a specific stopping rule, our approach will simply be to solve for the maximum value of the exchange option over all possible stopping rules. Clearly, this approach will result in a value for the exchange option that dominates the value of the exchange option resulting from any other stopping rule that might be chosen by the investor. Intuitively, the maximized value of the exchange option can be viewed as an "upper bound on an upper bound."
Given this structure, we can now determine the maximized value of the exchange option. This can be obtained by solving for the stopping rule that maximizes the expression given above,
(5) As shown in the appendix, the stopping rule that maximizes the value of the exchange option has a surprisingly simple form-the maximizing stopping rule is simply to sell the liquid asset immediately at time zero. Thus, τ 0. The intuition for this result is easily understood. By compensating an investor for illiquidity in a way that allows them to attain the maximum of X T and Y T , the investor has a strong incentive to ensure that X T and Y T are as different as possible. By stopping at time zero, the exchange option allows the investor to choose between payoffs linked to the most temporally divergent values of the asset price possible: S 0 and S T .
Finally, to obtain the maximized value of the exchange option, we substitute the maximizing stopping rule τ 0 into Equation (4). It is easily shown that the resulting value for the exchange option and upper bound on the discount for illiquidity is given by
This closed-form solution for the value of the exchange option has a very simple structure. In particular, the value of the exchange option is an explicit function of both the length of the illiquidity horizon T and the volatility of the liquid asset as measured by σ.
The discount for illiquidity is easily shown to be an increasing function of both the illiquidity horizon T and the volatility parameter σ. These comparative statics results are intuitive since an increase in T restricts the stopping rules available to the investor further, while an increase in σ increases the opportunity cost of not being able to trade. The dependence of the discount on volatility and the horizon T parallels the results in Copeland and Galai (1983) and others who use optiontheoretic frameworks to model illiquidity.
Given the closed-form solution for the exchange option, the lower bound on the value of the illiquid asset is given by subtracting the value of the exchange option from the value of an equivalent liquid asset.
Discussion
These results for the lower bound on the value of illiquid or thinly traded securities have many interesting implications. To illustrate, Table 1 reports the lower bounds for illiquidity horizons ranging from one day to 30 years, and for volatilities ranging from 10% to 50%. Table 1 shows that illiquidity can have a dramatic effect on asset values. In particular, the price of an investment could be discounted by as much as 20%-40% for illiquidity horizons ranging from two to five years. Furthermore, asset prices could be discounted by more than 50% for illiquidity horizons of 10 years or longer. Although our results provide only lower bounds on the values of illiquid or thinly traded assets, these lower bounds are actually consistent with empirical evidence about discounts for illiquidity.
The effects of illiquidity can also be substantial even for relatively short horizons. Table 1 shows that a one-day illiquidity horizon implies a lower bound on the value of an illiquid asset ranging from 99.75% to 98.74% of the value of the liquid asset. Similarly, for a one-week horizon, the lower bound ranges from 99.45% to 97.23% of the value of the liquid asset.
These results imply that the discounts for illiquidity horizons measured in days are surprisingly large. For example, an investor who bought an illiquid asset at a discount of 1%, but was then able to sell a day later at the fully liquid price would realize a huge annualized rate of return on the transaction. This suggests that the value of immediacy (the ability to sell immediately) could represent one of the largest types of risk premia in financial markets.
To explore this, we compute the annualized discounts for illiquidity by dividing the discounts implied Notes. This table reports the annualized percentage discount for illiquidity where this value is computed as the ratio of the percentage discount for illiquidity divided by the length of the illiquidity horizon measured in years. Discounts for illiquidity are expressed as a fraction of the value of an equivalent liquid asset. Volatility denotes the annualized volatility of returns for an equivalent liquid asset.
by the results in Table 1 by the illiquidity horizons. These annualized discounts are reported in Table 2 . As shown, the annualized discounts for short horizons such as a day or a week can be orders of magnitude greater than those for longer horizons. For example, the annualized discount for illiquidity for a one-day horizon is approximately 16 times as large as that for a one-year horizon.
As an alternative way of viewing these results, Table 3 reports the marginal discount of illiquidity as the illiquidity horizon ranges from one to 20 days. Specifically, we report the discount for a one-day horizon, the marginal or incremental increase in the discount as the horizon is increased to two days from one day, the marginal or incremental increase in the discount as the horizon is increased to three days from two days, and so forth.
As illustrated in Table 3 , the discount for illiquidity for the first day is much larger than for the second, third, etc. days. In particular, the discount for the first day of illiquidity is 2.41 times that for the second day, 3.15 times that for the third day, 8.83 times that for the 20th day, and 32.33 times the discount for the day one year later. Clearly, liquidity today is worth much more than liquidity tomorrow.
These results are consistent with the literature on the value of immediacy. For example, Demsetz (1968) defines immediacy as the price concession that would be needed to transact immediately. Our results indicate that this price concession could be relatively large, particularly for assets with higher return volatilities such as stocks. Other authors who focus on the valuation of immediacy include Stoll (2000) , who develops a regression-based model of the price of immediacy, and Grossman and Miller (1988) , who model market liquidity as being determined by the supply and demand for immediacy. The lower bounds in Table 1 also illustrate an interesting symmetry between the length of the illiquidity horizon and the volatility of the asset. In particular, doubling the volatility has essentially the same effect on the lower bound as quadrupling the length of the illiquidity horizon. The reason for this symmetry is easily seen from the expression for the lower bound in Equation (6). As shown, the lower bound depends on volatility and length of the illiquidity horizon only through the product σ 2 T. From an intuitive perspective, this means that neither volatility nor the length of the illiquidity horizon are fundamental in determining the lower bound. Rather, it is the total realized variance σ 2 T before the asset can be traded again that matters. This implies that volatility and the timing of illiquidity are fundamentally entangled in the sense that their effects are indistinguishable from each other.
This notion of entanglement may also help explain why some assets such as Treasury bills are viewed as inherently more liquid than stocks even when orders for either can be executed within seconds. Since stocks have higher volatility, their lower bounds will always be smaller than is the case for Treasury bills even when both are tradable at the same frequency. Liquidity is not simply a function of market microstructure. Rather, it depends also on the inherent riskiness of the underlying asset. These considerations may help explain why concerns about liquidity become Downloaded from informs.org by [164.67.176 .167] on 19 January 2018, at 16:03 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
particularly acute during volatile high-stress periods in the financial markets.
Extension to Dividends
In this section, we extend the analysis to the situation in which the asset pays dividends, coupons, or other cash payouts over time. This situation differs from the earlier case in that when an investor sells the liquid asset, the investor no longer receives the stream of dividends. In contrast, the holder of an illiquid asset continues to receive dividends until the illiquidity horizon is reached. For symmetry, we will assume that dividends are reinvested in the riskless asset as they are received.
Given this structure, the value X T of the investor's position at time T from following the optimal stopping rule is S τ e r(T−τ) + ∫ τ 0 ρ s e r(T−s) ds where ρ s is the dividend (assumed continuous). The value Y T of the investor's position at time T from following the restricted stopping rule is S T + ∫ T 0 ρ s e r(T−s) ds. As before, the upper bound on the discount for illiquidity is given by the value of the exchange option with cash flow at time T of max(0, X T − Y T ).
Despite the introduction of dividends into the framework, the appendix shows that the stopping strategy that maximizes the value of this exchange option is identical. Specifically, the maximizing stopping rule is to sell the liquid asset immediately at time zero, τ 0. The intuition for this result is the same as before; the value of the exchange option is maximized when the value of X T and Y T are as temporally divergent as possible.
The specific functional form of the exchange option will clearly depend on the nature of the dividend stream ρ t . To provide some examples of the effect of dividends on the discount for illiquidity, we will make the standard assumption that the underlying asset has a constant dividend yield. Specifically, we assume that the dividend is ρS t , where ρ is a constant. Given this assumption, the asset price dynamics in Equation (1) imply that dividends are random and conditionally log normally distributed. Sums of log normals, however, are not log normal, which implies that the exchange option does not have a simple closed-form solution. Accordingly, we will solve for the value of the exchange option via straightforward simulation. Table 4 presents lower bounds for the value of the illiquid asset for dividend yields ranging from 0 to 8%, and where volatility is held fixed at 30%.
As shown, dividends can have a major effect on the discount for illiquidity, particularly for longer horizons. Furthermore, the discount for illiquidity decreases as the dividend yield increases. This result is intuitive since by receiving dividends, an investor in an illiquid asset is able to convert some of his position Notes. This table reports the percentage lower bounds on the value of an illiquid asset where the asset pays a continuous dividend at the indicated dividend yield. The lower bound is expressed as a percentage of the price of an equivalent liquid asset. Asset return volatility is fixed at 30%.
into cash sooner than if the asset did not pay dividends. In essence, by paying dividends or other cash flows, an illiquid asset partially liquidates itself. Thus, the illiquidity constraint is relaxed to some extent by the payment of dividends. These results have many important implications for illiquid investments such as partnerships, private equity, venture capital, closely held firms, etc. Specifically, these results suggest that investors in these types of assets have strong incentives to accelerate the payment of distributions, dividends, and other cash flows to reduce the impact of illiquidity on their holdings.
Robustness
For simplicity, we have focused on the case where an investor faces illiquidity constraints until a fixed time T. For many situations, this characterization of illiquidity is very realistic. For example, most of the examples given in the introduction such as retirement and pension assets, life insurance and annuities, private equity and venture capital, restricted options and shares, fixed income investments, etc. clearly have finite horizons. On the other hand, however, there are clearly other forms of illiquidity that may not have a fixed horizon. Thus, it is important to consider how robust the results are to this simplifying assumption.
As one way of addressing this issue, we examine how the results change when the length of the illiquidity horizon increases unboundedly. This can be seen in Table 4 , which reports the lower bounds for illiquid asset values for values of T as large as 1,000 years. As shown, with the exception of the zero-dividend-yield case, the lower bounds for 100-and 1,000-year horizons are very similar to those for much shorter horizons. For example, when the dividend yield is 4%, the Downloaded from informs.org by [164.67.176 .167] on 19 January 2018, at 16:03 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
lower bound is 62.659% for T 30, 61.161% for T 100, and 61.075% for T 1,000. These results suggest that our modeling approach can still provide useful bounds even in cases where the assets may be illiquid for arbitrarily long horizons-that the results are robust to large changes in the value of T.
As an alternative way of modeling illiquidity, we extend the basic framework to the situation where the asset is illiquid until time T, but then can only be sold at a discount (reflecting ongoing illiquidity beyond time T). Let γS T denote the price at which the asset can be sold at time T, where 0 < γ ≤ 1. Following the same approach as earlier, it is easily shown that the value of the exchange option compensating the investor for the illiquidity of the asset is now given by
where
These results raise an intriguing question: Is there a recursive or "fixed point" value of γ such that if the asset could only be sold at a discounted price of γS T at time T, then the lower bound at time zero would have a similarly discounted value of γS 0 ? Strictly speaking, the answer is no since it is easily shown that γS 0 represents an upper bound. On the other hand, it turns out that γ can be chosen so that the lower bound at time zero is arbitrarily close to γS 0 . This is illustrated in Table 5 , which shows the values of γ such that the discount at time zero equals the discount at time T, within an accuracy of 0.10%. Thus, for all practical purposes, a recursive solution of this nature is feasible. 5 These results illustrate that the basic modeling framework can easily be extended to allow for less than perfect liquidity at time T. Notes. This table reports the value of γ such that if the asset can be sold at γ times the fully liquid value at the end of the illiquidity horizon, then the lower bound at time zero is γ times the current fully liquid value (within an accuracy of 0.10%). Volatility denotes the volatility of returns for an equivalent liquid asset.
Finally, in the next section, we show that the model can also be generalized to the case where the horizon T may be stochastic. This again argues that the basic nature of the lower bound results is robust to changes in the modeling assumptions.
Random Illiquidity Horizons
To allow for a random illiquidity horizon, let us assume that the asset remains illiquid until the realization of a random event, which we model using a Poisson process with intensity λ. Thus, the illiquidity horizon T is exponentially distributed with density λ exp(−λT). In turn, this implies that the mean time that the asset is illiquid is 1/λ.
Since the exchange option value in Equation (6) provides the upper bound given a specific horizon T, we can solve for the upper bound in this random horizon case by taking the expectation of the exchange option value with respect to the exponential density of T. As shown in the appendix, this leads to the following remarkably simple expression for the expected value of the exchange option,
(10) Table 6 illustrates the lower bounds on thinly traded assets implied by this formula for various combinations of the mean illiquidity horizon (measured by 1/λ) and asset volatility. As shown, the lower bound when the mean illiquidity horizon is one day is higher than the lower bound for a fixed illiquidity horizon of one day-as shown in Table 1 -and similarly for all of the other horizons. At first glance, this result may seem Notes. This table reports the lower bound on the value of an illiquid asset expressed as a percentage of the price of an equivalent liquid asset. In this case, the asset remains illiquid until the realization of a Poisson process with intensity λ. The mean illiquidity horizon represents the average time that the asset is illiquid (determined as 1/λ). Volatility denotes the volatility of returns for an equivalent liquid asset.
counterintuitive since it implies that the discount for illiquidity is less when the illiquidity horizon is random than when it is fixed-almost as if investors preferred uncertainty about the illiquidity horizon. The rationale for this result, however, is a simple artifact of Jensen's inequality. Specifically, the exchange option is a convex function of the length of the illiquidity horizon. Thus, uncertainty over the illiquidity horizon results in the expected value being higher than the value of the exchange option evaluated at the expected length of the illiquidity horizon.
Conclusion
We model illiquidity as a restriction on the stopping rules that an investor can follow in selling asset holdings. We use this framework to derive realistic lower bounds on the value of illiquid and thinly traded investments.
A number of economic insights emerge from this analysis. For example, we show that immediacy plays a unique role and is much more highly valued than ongoing liquidity. In addition, we show that illiquidity can reduce the value of an asset substantially. For illiquidity horizons on the order of those common in private equity, the discount for illiquidity can be as much as 30%-50%. Although large in magnitude, these discounts are consistent with the empirical evidence on the valuation of thinly traded assets. Thus, these lower bounds could be useful in determining reservation prices and providing conservative valuations in situations where other methods of valuation are not available.
Finally, we find that the discount for illiquidity decreases as the cash flow generated by the underlying asset increases. Thus, investors in private ventures may have strong incentives to increase dividends and other cash flows to reduce the impact of illiquidity on their holdings. This implies that the illiquid nature of investments in partnerships, private equity, venture capital, LBOs, etc. has the potential to introduce agency conflicts as cash flow policy is impacted.
At the stopping time τ, the value of S τ is known and is no longer stochastic. Thus, the value of the exchange option as of time τ is simply the present value of a put option on with strike price S τ e r(T−τ) and time until expiration of T − τ. Substituting these values into the Black-Scholes formula above gives the value of the exchange option at time τ,
which is Equation (3).
Standard results now imply that the value at time zero of the exchange option can be obtained by discounting the value in Equation (A.4),
where the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution of S τ and the stopping time τ under the risk-neutral measure.
To find the stopping rule that maximizes the value of the exchange option at time zero, we rewrite Equation (A.5) as
(A.6) where the inner expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of S τ conditional on τ. From the dynamics of S given in Equation (1), it is readily shown that
The expression in Equation (A.8), however, is an exponential martingale. Thus, E[e −rτ S τ ] S 0 for all τ because of the strong Markov property of S t .
Substituting this last result into Equation (A.6) gives
From the properties of the standard normal distribution function, however, it is easily shown that N(x) − N(−x), where x > 0, is an increasing function of x. Thus, the expression in Equation (A.9) is maximized when τ takes the lowest value possible. In turn, this implies that the the stopping rule that maximizes the value of the exchange option in Equation (A.9) is to stop immediately, τ 0. Substituting this result into Equation (5) leads to the maximized value of the exchange option given in Equation (6).
As an alternative derivation of this last result, we could proceed recursively to show that at time T − , the value of Downloaded from informs.org by [164.67.176 .167] on 19 January 2018, at 16:03 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. the exchange option is maximized by stopping rather than waiting and stopping at time T. Similarly, the value of the exchange option is maximized by stopping at time T − 2 rather than at time T − , and so forth. This recursive argument again shows that the maximizing stopping rule is τ 0.
Differentiating the exchange option value in Equation (6) with respect to σ gives This last equation can also be expressed as .20) where W is a martingale and is independent of S τ . It is readily seen that the variance of W is a decreasing function of τ because of the independence of Brownian increments. From Theorem 8 of Merton (1973) , this implies that the value of the exchange option at time τ is a decreasing function of τ. Following a similar line of reasoning as above, this implies that the time-zero value of the exchange option is maximized by setting τ 0. Finally, to solve for the expected value of the exchange option when the illiquidity horizon T is exponentially distributed, we note that Equation (6) can be expressed as .21) where erf( · ) is the error function described in Abramowitz and Stegun (1964, Chap. 7) . Using Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (1980, Equation 6 .283.2), the expectation (A.22) reduces to Equation (10).
Endnotes
1 For example, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 157 allows for the use of unverifiable inputs in the valuation of a broad category of illiquid assets that are designated as level 3 investments. The lower bound presented in this paper provides a conservative but much more objective standard for valuing these types of illiquid assets. 2 More formally, let I [0, T], T < ∞, define the set of times where stopping is possible in the continuous time framework of this paper. Let (Ω, F, F t∈I , P) be a filtered probability space. A random variable τ: Ω → I defined by a stopping rule is a stopping time if the event {τ ≤ t} belongs to the σ-field F t for all t in I. For a discussion of stopping times, see Karatzas and Shreve (2000) .
3 By focusing on investors who are willing to consider holding thinly traded assets, we implicitly make the standard assumption that preferences are defined in terms of the portfolio value at time T. Thus, we rule out pathologies such as where the inability to sell at some time prior to T would result in an unboundedly negative utility, since, in that case, the investor would clearly never consider holding the illiquid asset in the first place. 4 I am grateful to the referee for raising this issue.
